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Abstract
Decentralization is increasing in all parts of the world. Assessing the eﬃciency of decentralization as
a means to mitigate ethnic conﬂict is then of primarily importance. This paper builds a simple model of
decentralization as an empowerment mechanism. It suggests that decentralization could promote peace
conditional on a set of countries and groups characteristics. Typically, decentralization should empower
minorities which are small at the national level, while representing a critical mass of the population in
the regions they live in. Empirical results conﬁrm that decentralization impacts ethnic conﬂict only when
those conditioning factors are controlled for. Furthermore, decentralization dampens all forms of ethnic
violence for groups spatially concentrated enough and/or for groups having a local majority. In contrast,
it fuels protest and even rebellion for groups lacking one. The paper then highlights the crucial need to
build checks and balances mechanisms at the regional level for local minorities not being harmed by the
decentralization process.
JEL Codes: C33, H77
Keywords: Minorities, Conﬂict, Decentralization, Panel Data Analysis
1 Introduction
Internal wars became a major concern of political scientists since the end of World War II as the number
of interstate conﬂicts were decreasing and as the human cost of civil strifes appeared to be so horriﬁc.
Within the ﬁeld of civil wars, particular attention has been paid to ethnic conﬂict, in the extent that most
of recent wars seemed to have been driven by ethnic hatred (see Sambanis, 2001 for example).
Federalism, or political decentralization, is one of the most used mechanism to prevent ethnic conﬂicts
in the developing world (see, e.g. Brazil, India, Indonesia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Nigeria) but also in western
countries (Belgium, Switzerland, Canada, Spain among others). Currently, the reorganization of Iraq and
Afghanistan entails political decentralization as a crux point (Brancati, 2006). The rationale is that giving
groups more control over their own aﬀairs in their regions protect them against predatory politics from
the center (Lĳphart, 1977, 1996; Lustick, Miodownik, and Eidelson, 2004). Thus, federal organization
is supposed to have contained separatist movements from minorities notably in Canada (Simeon, 2004)
and Spain (Beramendi and Maiz, 2004; Gurr, 1994). However, failures of federalism in former Yugoslavia,
Czechoslovakia and Soviet Union casted doubt about the eﬀectiveness of decentralization at preventing
conﬂicts (Roeder, 1991, Cornell, 2002). According to Cornell (p. 252), "The institution of autonomous
regions is conducive to secessionism because institutionalizing and promoting the separate identity of a
titular group increases that group’s cohesion and willingness to act, and establishing political institutions
increases the capacity of that group to act". The weakening of central power and centrifugal politics
pursued by institutionalized subnational leaders were at the roots of the collapse of former Yugoslavia,
Czechoslovakia and Soviet Union according to Roeder.
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Beside numerous case studies, few large-N studies have been done to assess the causal impact of feder-
alism. Relying upon the Minorities At Risk database, several authors have estimated the role of federalism
on ethnopolitical rebellion and protest (Cohen, 1997; Saideman, Lanoue, Campenni, and Stanton, 2002;
Brancati, 2006; Bermeo, 2002 or Bakke and Wibbels, 2006). Most of these studies suggest that federalism
is an eﬀective peace-building mechanism while this eﬀect tends to be conditional. Saideman, Lanoue,
Campenni, and Stanton (2002) ﬁnd that federalism is more eﬃcient in autocracies than in democracies,
Bermeo (2002) brings evidence that federalism works better in wealthy countries whereas Brancati (2006)
shows that the combination of federalism and existing regional parties is conﬂict-producing. Nonetheless,
those studies, at the notable exception of Brancati (2006), fail to control for all factors that can inﬂuence
both federalism and ethnic conﬂict.
This paper focus on decentralization as it is increasingly implemented since the past decade, notably
in the developing world, and even for reasons totally disconnected from the issue of ethnic conﬂict man-
agement. A simple model of decentralization as empowerment is built in order to reveal conditional on
which factors (if any) decentralization could increase the welfare of political minorities. It highlights that
small groups, concentrated in one region in which they represent a signiﬁcant share of the population
are good candidates for beneﬁting from decentralization. The model underlines also the role of other
factors like the presence of a low local social heterogeneity combined with a high national one or spatial
concentration patterns of groups others than the considered one. It appears that such factors are likely
to inﬂuence in the same sense both decentralization and conﬂict. Thus, failing to control for them biases
OLS estimations. In that case, the estimated eﬀect of decentralization should tend toward zero.
In a second time, predictions of the theoretical model are tested while emphasizing the issue of omitted
variable bias. Two kinds of estimations are led: OLS with the maximum number of conditioning factors
suggested by the model and ﬁxed eﬀects. After that, two tests of explicit conditional eﬀects of decentral-
ization are provided. The ﬁrst one ascertains if, as expected, groups spatially concentrated beneﬁt more
from decentralization than dispersed ones. The second one focus on a broader variable, i.e. presence of
local majority. The overall picture is that predictions of the model tend to be conﬁrmed. After controlling
for the appropriate controls, decentralization appears as an eﬀective mean to mitigate ethnic conﬂict while
failing to do so gives the impression that decentralization is unrelated to conﬂict. Furthermore, results
suggest that decentralization is desirable for groups spatially concentrated and/or for groups having a
local majority whereas it may be harmful for others.
The outline of the paper is as follows. Section 2 reviews quickly the main arguments advanced for
decentralization. Section 3 presents a model where decentralization works as an empowerment mechanism.
Section 4 is devoted to the exposition of the empirical strategy. Section 5 presents the results while section
6 concludes.
2 Decentralization and Conflict: An Overview
Federalism is supposed to prevent conﬂicts by "giving groups control over their own political, social and
economic aﬀairs" (Brancati, 2006). Disposing of prerogatives in schooling, language or taxation policies at
the local level should protect groups from threats posed by central power and makes possible for them to
implement policies closer to their wishes. Federalism is one the ﬁve types of power-sharing arrangements
that Lĳphart (1977) calls for divided societies. Stepan (2004) argues that subnational governments may
be veto players in the sense of Tsebelis (2002), i.e. their agreement if not their compliance is needed in
order that a law passes. In the same vein that the mutual veto of Lĳphart (1977), the constitutional veto
power of subnational governments implies that the political system is more inclusive, and then, is less
likely to hurt some segments of the society. Federalism, as a check and balance mechanism, may then help
to mitigate the ethnic security dilemma (Posen, 1993). The ethnic security dilemma refers to a situation
in which an ethnic group fears that another one seizes power and uses it against him. A federal structure
may insulate ethnic groups from central authority and dampen or impede predatory politics.
All the above refers to eﬀects of federal system per se, as the deﬁnition of Riker (1964) states it. How-
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ever, this study focuses on ﬁscal decentralization without regard to the constitutional design of countries.
Yet, ﬁscal decentralization is supposed to inﬂuence conﬂict by diminishing the distance between the gov-
ernment and the people. Devolving power to subunits permits to design and provide local public goods
which correspond to the preferences of local constituents. When preferences are widely heterogeneous
across jurisdictions, decentralization tends to be preferable to uniform policy (Oates, 1972; Seabright,
1996; Bardhan and Mookherjee, 2005). Regarding ethnic conﬂict, decentralization may be desirable if dif-
ferent ethnic groups are characterized by diﬀerent preferences over public policies. Alesina and La Ferrara
(2000) ﬁnd that individual participation in diﬀerent types of organizations is lower when communities are
more racially and ethnically heterogeneous. Alesina, Baqir, and Easterly (1999) present evidence that the
shares of spending in productive public goods are reduced when ethnic fragmentation of the city is higher.
In both cases, the rationale is that diﬀerent ethnic groups have diﬀerent preferences over the nature and
the size of public goods which have to be provided.
Then, decentralization is supposed to increase the well-being of minority groups if it empowers them
enough so that they can design and implement public policies close to their preferences. The empowerment
of minorities is more easily reached if they are concentrated in one region in which they represent the
majority or a signiﬁcant minority of the population. On the contrary, if the demographic weight of the
minority is the same at the local level than at the country one, decentralization is less likely to give to
minority control over its own aﬀairs. It is even possible that things are worst at the local level because elite
capture is supposed to be higher at low levels of government (Bardhan, 2002; Bardhan and Mookherjee,
2000; Platteau and Abraham, 2002).
Another component of empowerment should be democracy, above all if the minority is dominant in
terms of population in some regions. First, the power of central state to override local laws and decisions is
constitutionally reduced in democracies. Second, in a context of patronage, central state could rely upon
marginal loyal groups at the local level at the expense of political minorities more important in terms of
population. Roeder (1991) shows that the central state in USSR supported the dominant group in the
republics at the expense of local minorities. In any cases, democracy is supposed to be a pre-requisite for
local empowerment of minorities.
To insight those conditions necessary to make eﬀective decentralization, we will now turn to the outline
of a model where decentralization is potentially able to reduce ethnic conﬂict through the empowerment
of minorities.
3 A Simple Model of Decentralization as Empowerment Mech-
anism
Assume that a society is composed of K groups indexed by i = 1, . . . K and G districts indexed by
j = 1, . . . G. The population mass is normalized to one. ni represents the numeric weight of group i in
the country while
∑K
K=1 nk = 1. Likewise, nj is the share of the overall population living in district j and∑G
j=1 nj = 1. Each district is populated by an equal number of groups
1, H with the assumption that
H < K reﬂecting a greater social homogeneity at the local level. Finally, nij is the share of population
from group i residing in district j such as
∑G
j=1 nij = ni and
∑G
j=1
∑K
k=1 nkj = 1.
Political outcome is summarized by a vector of public policy q which is designed centrally and locally.
The parameter γ ∈ [0, 1] represents the relative weight of decentralized policies in the country. When
γ = 0, all decisions are taken at the central level whereas when γ = 1 all political decisions are designed
locally. Groups may diﬀer in their preferences over q. Following the pure contest form of the model of
conﬂict developed by Esteban and Ray (1999), we assume that U(qik) = 0,∀k 6= i, i.e. each group in
the society values only its most preferred policy U(qii),∀i. U(qii) is normalized to 1. Then, the utility of
group i, wi with respect to public policy is as follows
1This assumption is only made to simplify the form of the subsequent propositions. It could be relaxed without changing
the nature of the results.
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Wi(q) = pi(1− γ) + γ

 G∑
j=1
nij
ni
sij

 , (1)
where γ ∈ [0, 1],
nij
ni
∈ [0, 1] and
∑G
j=1
nij
ni
= 1. pi is the probability that group i gets its most preferred
policy implemented at the statewide level while sij stands for the corresponding probability in region j.
Group i weights utility he derives from each district by the share of its population therein. This implies
that groups care only about policies directly aﬀecting them. In particular, group i is totally indiﬀerent
to policies implemented in regions where it is absent. 2 It involves also that there are no spillovers across
districts.
Furthermore, it should be clear from (1) that there are no central or local policies per se. Rather,
the model is concerned with central or local implementation of policies. To put it diﬀerently, satisfaction
derived from a given public policy is independent on whatever level of government provides it. Decentral-
ization plays a role in the model only through the diﬀerentiated degree of openness of the decision-making
process at each layer of government.
Groups have the possibility to engage costly eﬀorts in order to increase the probability that their
preferred policy is implemented. Here we suppose that groups are perfectly homogeneous so that issues
of free-riding and within groups distributional conﬂicts are ruled out. The functions mapping eﬀorts
of lobbying onto political outcome (Contest Success Function, CSF) take generally a logit ratio-form .
However, to keeps things simple, the CSF in the model will take the following simpliﬁed probit-form
(Kräkel, 2006)
pi(xi, x−i) =
nixi −
∑
k 6=i nkxk + e
Ke
, (2)
where pi is the probability of winning in national politics for group i, xi the lobbying eﬀorts of group
i and e a luck factor uniformously distributed over the interval [− 1e ,
1
e ]. Likewise,
sij(rij , r−ij) =
nijrij −
∑
h6=i
∑
j nhjrhj + e
He
(3)
deﬁnes the probability that the most preferred policy of group i is implemented in district j. rij
is the lobbying eﬀort of group i in region j. The ﬁrst derivative of pi with respect to xi is equal to
∂pi
∂xi
= niKe . Similarly,
∂sij
∂rij
=
nij
He . The marginal return of lobbying is then constant and does not depend
on expenditures of other groups. It is increasing with the size of the group and decreasing with the
number of contestants and the luck factor. Hence, the marginal eﬃcacy of lobbying depends on the
absolute size of the considered group and not on its relative size. It implies that a potential beneﬁt of
decentralization consisting in a greater numeric (then political) weight of minorities at the local level is
not accounted by this CSF -form. On the contrary, greater social homogeneity, another alleged advantage
of decentralization, is considered by the assumption H < K. In spite of that, it will be shown below that
regional concentration of groups plays a crucial role in the model. This very speciﬁc contest function has
the advantage to ignore strategic interactions in conﬂict3. It allows then to derive the principal results
much more easily.
Finally, lobbying has a cost c, identical whatever national or local, taking the iso-elastic following form
2On this ground, the model belongs more to the field of redistributive politics than the one of distributive politics in the
sense of Dixit and Londregan (1996). Politics is reduced to redistribution of individual benefits and groups have no ethical
positions about how a society should be ruled.
3Strategic interactions are considered as in Bulow, Geanakoplos, and Klemperer (1985), i.e. the profitability of a given
strategy for player i depends on the strategic choices of other players.
4
ci(xi, rij) =
1
αx
α
i +
1
α
∑
j r
α
ij , with α > 1. Cost of lobbying is then increasing and convex with eﬀorts,
as in Esteban and Ray (1999).
Then,
∑G
j=1 sij
nij
ni
is the aggregate utility that group i derives from decentralized policies. This
winner-take-all description of politics could indiﬀerently been interpreted as a contest for an exogenous
rent. It is worth noting that in this model the chance of inﬂuencing the policy is proportional to size of
groups but that the political process is a winner-take-all one. Secondly, lobbying is viewed here as a form
of political participation rather than as mere social conﬂict. In other words, conﬂict is assumed to be
driven by insuﬃcient political participation (lobbying) departing in that from the vision of Esteban and
Ray (1999) who assimilate conﬂict to lobbying.
We are now able to write down the objective function of group i
Wi = (1− γ)
(
nixi −
∑
k 6=i nkxk + e
Ke
)
+ γ
∑
j
nij
ni
(
nijrij −
∑
j
∑
h6=i nhjrhj + e
He
)
−
1
α

xαi +∑
j
rαij


(4)
Group i chooses the optimal level of xi and rij ,∀j to maximize its welfare. FOCs are
∂Wi
∂xi
= (1− γ)
ni
Ke
− xα−1i = 0 (5)
∂Wi
∂rij
= γ
nij
ni
nij
He
− rα−1ij = 0,∀j (6)
Given the functional forms, SOCs are always satisﬁed. FOCs deﬁne the equilibrium eﬀorts for each
player given those of the others.
x∗i =
(
(1− γ)
ni
Ke
) 1
(α−1)
(7)
r∗ij =
(
γ
nij
ni
nij
He
) 1
(α−1)
(8)
As there are no strategic interactions among groups, (7) and (8) are not simply reaction functions
but deﬁne also the expenditures at the Nash equilibrium. Derivation of comparative statics is then
straightforward and give
∂x∗i
∂γ
= −
(
ni
Ke (1− γ)
)1/(α−1)
(1− γ)(α− 1)
(9)
∂r∗ij
∂γ
=
(
nij
ni
nij
Heγ
)1/(α−1)
γ(α− 1)
(10)
It is easy to check that the augmentation of local lobbying outweights the decrease of national one if
(1− γ)
∑
j
(
nij
ni
nij
He
γ
)(1/(α−1))
> γ
( ni
Ke
(1− γ)
)(1/(α−1))
(11)
Taking the special case where α = 2 and rearranging give
5
∑
j
(
nij
ni
)2
>
H
K
(12)
Increase of aggregate lobbying for player i following decentralization arises when social heterogeneity
at the local level is clearly lower than at national level. This relationship is conditional on the degree
of group regional concentration. The higher the group concentration, the less stringent the condition
about social heterogeneity. It follows that decentralization is expected to increase local lobbying from
ethnic minorities in ethnofederations where administrative boundaries overlap almost perfectly cultural
boundaries 4.
To uncover the eﬀect of decentralization on welfare (and then on conﬂict as it is assumed that the two
variables are inversely related), it is necessary to write down the total diﬀerentiation ofWi(x
∗
i , x−i∗ , rij∗ , r−ij∗)
with respect to decentralization
dW (xi(γ), x−i(γ), rij(γ), r−ij(γ))
dγ
=

 G∑
j=1
nij
ni
sij − pi

+

(1− γ)
(
∂pi
∂x∗i
∂x∗i
∂γ
+
K∑
k=1
∂pi
∂x∗k
∂x∗k
∂γ
)
+ γ

 G∑
j=1
nij
ni
((
∂sij
∂r∗ij
∂r∗ij
∂γ
)
+
∑
h
∂shj
∂r∗hj
∂r∗hj
∂γ
)
)


(13)
The ﬁrst term corresponds to the direct eﬀect of decentralization consisting in shifting decision-making
toward local tier of government. This eﬀect is positive if the probability of inﬂuencing the political
decisions is higher at the local level. The second term is the strategic eﬀect accounting for changes in
optimal levels of lobbying from all players. Writing the above equation with our special functional and
simplifying lead to
dWi
dγ
=
K
H
γ

∑
j
nij
ni

n3ij
ni
−
∑
h6=i
n3hj
nh
+ e



 (γ + 1)− γ

H
K
(1− γ)

n2i −∑
k 6=i
n2k + e



 (14)
The ﬁrst term of (14) corresponds to the change in local empowerment in response to an increase
in decentralization while the second term refers to the variation of empowerment in national politics. If
group i does not represent an absolute majority of the population, which ﬁts our focus on minorities, the
second term is positive. It comes from the fact that national politics are unfavorable to a little group.
Reducing the salience of centralized politics is then valued by minorities. This positive eﬀect is weighted
by the ratio H/K which tends to be low in ethnofederation and close to one in other kind of countries.
The ﬁrst term reveals a more complicated picture. There appears the same diﬀerences in population but
also patterns of group concentration. The most favorable situation for group i is when he is concentrated
in one region where other groups are virtually absent. Thus, there are two sources of empowerment for
group i: i) a greater numeric weight in the regions where he is concentrated than at the national level and
ii) a low interest in this district by other groups which are essentially present elsewhere. In addition, the
gap between the population of the minority and the one of other groups counts more than above since each
population share is raised at the power three rather than two 5. Finally, this ﬁrst term is more decisive
when decentralization is important and KH high, i.e. in ethnofederations. Summing up, decentralization
empowers minorities representing less than ﬁfty percent of the population when the following condition
4One could argue that a spatially concentrated group faces always a lower local heterogeneity than a dispersed one. But,
even if the two notions are closely related they are not identical. A group may well be concentrated in a highly diverse region
while a dispersed group may well face a homogeneous context.
5It is due to the fact that the share of group population living in a given region enters in the expression of optimal lobbying
efforts for each region.
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is fulﬁlled
−
K2
H2
1 + γ
1− γ


∑
j
nij
ni
(
n3ij
ni
−
∑
h6=i
n3hj
nh
)
+ e
n2i −
∑
k 6=i n
2
k + e

 > 1 (15)
Decentralization is an eﬃcient way to empower political minorities and then reducing ethnic conﬂict
when these ones are small relative to the whole population, concentrated in a few districts where they
represent a greater numeric weight and are relatively neglected by other groups focusing on other regions.
In addition, and it reinforces the above, it is particularly eﬀective when the social heterogeneity is low
at the local level and high at the national one. Finally, the initial level of decentralization is a positive
input in the ’empowerment function’. Conversely, political minorities which are signiﬁcant in the national
arena, and which have not any stronghold in the country, are worse oﬀ with decentralization and may
engage more in conﬂict.
This simple model has numerous limits which are acceptable only because it is aimed at helping the
design of the empirical strategy rather than developing a deep and general modeling of the decentralization-
conﬂict nexus. In particular, decentralization is supposed to inﬂuence conﬂict only through the notion of
empowerment, leaving aside its ﬁscal roles (ﬁscal appeasement), or its veto-player function. In addition,
several drawbacks of decentralization are not accounted by the model as the ’Cornell eﬀect’ and the
freezing of ethnoregional cleavages in time. Within the framework of the model, the linearity assumption
on appropriation functions and weighted social one are also very strong. However, this simple model
is able to provide clear-cut predictions on the eﬀect of decentralization on lobbying, empowerment and
conﬂict, conditional on a number of well-deﬁned factors. It appears that some of the factor appearing
on previous results cannot be measured precisely with existing data, like social heterogeneity at the local
level and group concentration patterns for every groups in a country.
In particular, and it is the main concern of the paper, equation (15) can be assimilated to the "potential
gain" of political violence. Indeed, decentralization does not "fall from the sky" but is the result of a
political process. National leaders are often reluctant to decentralize as it means a reduction of their
power and represents a mythicized or real risk of national dismantlement (O’Neill, 2003; Brancati, 2006).
Presence of ethnopolitical conﬂicts in the country exerts probably a powerful force on the rulers and favors
in the long run a delegation of authority 6. This is particularly true for democratic countries which cannot
easily use repression and whose leaders are more exposed to the political costs of an enduring conﬂict. In
the same time, those characteristics which make decentralization proﬁtable for a group facilitate also the
ignition of political violence. Typically, we can consider that ethnic groups may want to seize power at
the national level if it is possible, otherwise a higher degree of autonomy. As most minorities are small,
the former tends to be unreachable and it is likely that groups rather desire a control over their own
aﬀairs at the regional level. Groups which have the characteristics to beneﬁt from decentralization are
then arguably more likely to engage in conﬂict. Presence of this double relationship impedes any causal
interpretation of empirical estimations if these factors are not properly controlled for.
4 Data and Method
4.1 Empirical Strategy
The previous section has highlighted the need for controlling for a set of crucial conditioning factors.
Otherwise, the eﬀect of decentralization is expected to be insigniﬁcant. To see this more clearly, check
the model to estimate
6Brancati (2006) rightly argues that it is rather difficult to predict the reaction of the state facing ethnic movements. Accord-
ing to the author, the repression and the reinforcement of state authority should be as frequent as the opposite. Nevertheless,
in the long run the repression way becomes unbearably costly and a devolution of authority an obvious answer.
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yijt = β0 + β1Decentralizationjt + β2Xjt + β3Zijt + β4Kijt + uijt (16)
y is the measure of political violence, decentralization is the interest variable, X a set of country-level
variables, Z a set of measurable group-level controls and K represents all variables which are unobservable
for the researcher. Pooling estimations are biased if some elements of K explaining ethnic violence are
correlated with decentralization. The theoretical model of the previous section suggests that factors like
group concentration, size of the group at the national and the local level fall in this category. Failing to
control for them should cause OLS estimates of decentralization to be indistinguishable from zero. The
Minorities At Risk Database (MAR) provides informations on those factors which are then included in
the regressions (as elements of Z) in order to test properly the eﬃcacy of decentralization, with respect
to theoretical predictions.
However, some other characteristics appearing in (15) remain unobservable for the researcher and are
then comprised in K. Particularly, the ethnic heterogeneity at the local level (for regions the considered
minority lives in) and informations on the spatial distribution of other groups cannot be measured. Recall
that variation of local empowerment following an increase in the level of decentralization is proportional
to
∑
j
nij
ni
(
n3ij
ni
−
∑
h6=i
n3hj
nh
)
. So it is not enough to know ni, nij and
∑
h6=i nh, elements MAR makes
available, as the expression stresses the role of nhj/nh which is unknown. Concretely, it is a very diﬀerent
perspective for a group concentrated in a region in which it represents 80% of the population to face
only one other group or three other groups. Furthermore, if these other groups present in this region are
concentrated therein or are mainly represented elsewhere, implications of those groups in the politics of
this given region will be markedly diﬀerent. That is why pooling estimations may be still insuﬃcient.
Nonetheless, as all those elements (included also those which can be known through MAR) are very
structural characteristics, they can be viewed as broadly ﬁxed through time. This opens the way for
estimating (16) by ﬁxed eﬀects (FE) estimator. By considering deviations from the mean for all variables
of the model, time-invariant factors are ruled out with FE. The model to estimate is thus
(yijt − yij) = β1(Dec.j −Dec.j) + β2(Xjt −Xj) + β3(Zijt − Zij) + (uijt − uij) (17)
Besides, there may exist also some country unobservable heterogeneity which calls for using country
FE. Furthermore, the model highlights that what matters for a group is the geographic distribution of all
other groups. The repartition of ethnic groups throughout a country is better captured by country FE.
In addition, country characteristics should exert a stronger inﬂuence on decentralization than group ones,
as long as groups are small. That is why the following model is also estimated
yijt = β0 + β1Decentralizationjt + β2Xjt + β3Zijt + β4Kijt + αi + uijt (18)
where αi is a vector of country dummies and the remaining is the same than in (16).
4.2 Data and Measurement
All group-level variables stem from MAR. In particular, ethnic conﬂict will be approximated by Protest,
Rebellion and Communal Violence. Rebellion is on scale from 0 to 7 and refers to armed contestation
against the state, entailing campaigns of terrorism or guerrilla. It is the most organized and violent
form of contest. Communal violence measures the intensity of inter-groups conﬂict. On the contrary of
rebellion and protest, communal violence gauges conﬂict arising between groups, horizontally. It goes
from 0 to 6 and captures acts of harassment, anti-group demonstrations or communal warfare. Finally,
protest is closer to rebellion is spirit in that it measures anti-regime activities. The diﬀerence is that
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protest entails more spontaneous and/or less violent forms of actions. It ranges from 0 to 5 and refers to
demonstrations, strikes or riots. As a robustness check, all those three variables will also be considered as
binary ones. Speciﬁcally, rather than measuring the intensity of ethnic conﬂict, binary variables account
for the presence of ethnic conﬂict. They take the value one if the intensity is positive and zero otherwise.
Our variable of interest, decentralization, is approximated by the share of subnational expenditures on
overall state spending. Data come from Government Financial Statistics compiled by the International
Monetary Fund (IMF). This is the most widely used variable in the literature on ﬁscal federalism.
Following the prescriptions of the theoretical model, a large set of group-level controls have to be
included. Group’s proportion of the total population (gpro) and group spatial concentration index (group-
con) are directly obtained from MAR. Starting from the set of variables reg1p,reg2p...reg5p giving the
group’s proportion of the population at several levels of regional aggregation, a variable called localprop
is constructed by picking up the one corresponding to each group. This score is also multiplied by group
concentration index to create an interactive term between the relevant group’s local proportion of the
population and its concentration score (localprop*groupcon). In addition, group coherence index catness
is included as it may explain both violence (better organizational capacity) and decentralization (in that
it is correlated with group concentration index).
The model suggests also to include some country-level controls as the democracy score (measured by
Polity IV ) and the national ethnic heterogeneity. To capture this latter variable, the inverse of the ethnic
concentration index from Alesina, Devleeschauwer, Easterly, Kurlat, and Wacziarg (2003) is computed 7.
It gives the number of eﬀective ethnic groups (NEEG).
Finally, two variables not directly inspired by the model are included, namely the logarithms of GDP
per capita and population from the World Development Indicators . Indeed, it is likely that those variables
are related to conﬂict and decentralization.
Summing up, the estimation sample is constituted at best by 111 groups spread in 58 countries and
covering the period 1985-20018. Inclusion of all group-level controls severely reduces the number of
observations which falls at 708. For sake of comparability, all estimations are led on this subsample even
though 1165 points are available with FE. Nevertheless, the overall picture is similar when FE are ran on
the largest possible sample9.
Four ﬁnal observations to close the section. Firstly, FE can contribute to reduce the issue of selection
sample (Hug, 2003). Indeed, those structural characteristics that preside to the eligibility of the group
in the MAR database and which are not excludable in the conﬂict equation are controlled for with FE.
Secondly, the dependent variables are measured at the group-level while decentralization is only known
for the country as a whole. This involves that observations within a country are not independent. This
point is tackled by systematically correcting standard errors for clustering 10. Thirdly, the nature of the
dependent variables calls for the use of non linear estimators like logit or ordered logit ones. However,
the results are fundamentally unchanged when using instead OLS and FE which have the advantage to
preserve more informations and to provide conditional eﬀects easier to compute and interpret. Finally,
the panel used for estimations is not balanced. The decentralization score is much more available for
certain countries than for others. Likewise, some countries have numerous minorities while others count
just one. As a result, very diverse countries which are enough developed and democratic to have data on
decentralization are over-represented in the sample, as Kenya for example. Characteristics which explain
the degree of over- (under) representation may explain the level of conﬂict and decentralization. To correct
for this, regressions in which each observation is weighted by the inverse of the frequency by which its
corresponding country appears in the estimation sample are done.
7Actually the database gives the fractionalization index. The concentration index is obtained by taking the complement to
one.
8There are initially 284 groups in the MAR dataset but the variable of decentralization is not available for most of african
countries.
9Results not shown but available upon request, as all other results mentioned in the paper and not presented.
10This tends to increase the magnitude of standard errors
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5 Results
5.1 Decentralization and Ethnic Conflict
Table 1 and 2 present the results of estimations of (16) and (17) for the three measures of political violence.
For each of these variables, the ﬁrst column refers to OLS estimations, the second one to group ﬁxed eﬀects
and the third one to country ﬁxed eﬀects. This set of estimations is based on (15) which predicts that
decentralization should be eﬀective for groups small enough at the national level, controlling for diﬀerent
characteristics. Firstly, it appears that decentralization fails to signiﬁcantly reduce ethnic conﬂict with
the ﬁrst set of OLS estimations. It is true for each of the three variables of ethnic conﬂict, whatever
in continuous or binary form, and for weighted and unweighted regressions. That echoes the result of
Brancati (2006). The only signiﬁcant eﬀect of decentralization is the increase of protest (column(2), table
1). Secondly, turning to group FE estimations changes things substantively. Decentralization appears to
prevent signiﬁcantly the intensity and the presence of communal violence (for weighted and unweighted
regressions, column(9), table 1, 2). Furthermore, results suggest also that decentralization is associated
with lower risk of protest (column (6), table 2, weighted regressions) and lower likelihood of rebellion
(column 5, table 2, unweighted regression). This is conﬁrmed by country ﬁxed eﬀects which give very
similar results with the exception that decentralization is always unrelated to rebellion.
Those results tend to conﬁrm that decentralization may be an eﬀective means to dampen ethnic
strifes. It is nonetheless necessary to control for all elements appearing in the theory to uncover it, and
group-level variables stemming from MAR are seemingly not enough to do so. It is also worth noting that
decentralization appears to be eﬀective to dampen volatile forms of ethnic conﬂict (Protest and Communal
Violence) but not rebellion. Similarly, decentralization is generally more often signiﬁcantly associated with
lower presence of violence than with lower intensity of violence. This suggests that decentralization is
best suited to tackle low or moderate ethnic conﬂicts than large-scale ones.
Controls have generally the expected sign. Group concentrated or majoritary in one region are more
likely to rebel and less likely to engage in communal violence. Protest is essentially used by urban groups.
Interestingly, GDP per capita reduces signiﬁcantly rebellion and communal violence with OLS whereas
it produces the opposite eﬀect with FE. Likewise, population size tends to increase ethnic violence with
OLS and lowers it with FE.
At this point, recall that theory predicts that decentralization should exert a diﬀerentiated impact
on ethnic violence conditional on some group characteristics, like regional concentration, and on some
country ones, like democracy. It is the goal of the next part to test for presence of such conditional
eﬀects.
5.2 Decentralization and Ethnic Conflict: a Conditional Relationship ?
It has been shown that decentralization tends to reduce ethnic conﬂict once a crucial set of characteristics
have been controlled for. Hence, it remains to show that decentralization exerts a diﬀerentiated impact on
violence with respect to those characteristics. Tables 3 and 4 present the results with group concentration
as the conditioning variable. 11 The empowerment argument suggests that decentralization is particularly
suited for groups regionally concentrated enough, but may be detrimental to dispersed groups, other
things being equal. Empirical results tend to conﬁrm this point. For instance, decentralization increases
signiﬁcantly protest for dispersed groups (whatever the estimator) and urban ones (OLS only). The
protest-conducive eﬀect of decentralization for dispersed groups is robust to the use of weighted regressions
and binary dependent variable. On the other hand, group FE and above all country FE reveal that
urban groups reduce their level and frequency of protest with decentralization. Groups majoritary in
11It is worth noting that in the case of conditional effects, the marginal effect of decentralization is the sum of the coefficient
associated with decentralization plus the coefficient associated with the corresponding interaction variable . Likewise, standard
errors have also to be computed following the formula
√
varb1 + varb3 + 2covb1b3, where b1 is the variance of the standalone
coefficient and b3 the one associated with the interaction term. In the case of a continuous conditioning variable, 2covb1b3 has
to be multiplied by its value.
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one region seem to signiﬁcantly reduce their resort to protest with OLS estimations (column (1), table
1, unweighted regression), country FE (column (3), table 2, all regressions) and above all with group FE
(column (2), table 1, 2, all regressions). On the contrary, the coeﬃcient associated with decentralization
for concentrated groups is signiﬁcantly negative just once, with country FE (column (3), table 2, weighted
regression). The overall picture is then that decentralization is associated with an increase in the intensity
of protest (but not in the likelihood of protest) for widely dispersed groups and with a reduction of intensity
and above all of frequency of protest for groups majoritary in one region. The eﬀect of decentralization
for urban groups is unclear as each estimator gives its own result (an increase of protest for OLS, no
signiﬁcant eﬀect for group FE, a decrease for country FE) whereas groups concentrated in one region
seem unaﬀected by decentralization.
Turning to the rebellion variable, it appears with OLS estimations that decentralization signiﬁcantly
increases rebellion (intensity as well as frequency) for groups primarily urban and signiﬁcantly reduces
presence of rebellion for groups concentrated in one region. This last point is conﬁrmed by country
FE while group FE suggest that decentralization is associated with less episodes of rebellion for groups
majoritary in one region. Furthermore, group FE estimations show that decentralization is also associated
with less frequent rebellion episodes. This result is not conﬁrmed by country FE, but both contradict the
positive eﬀect suggested by OLS for urban groups. Finally, and surprisingly, decentralization may also
dampen intensity and frequency of rebellion for widely dispersed groups, but only for country FE. The
bottom line is then that decentralization is actually eﬀective at reducing the presence of rebellion and, in
a lesser extent, the intensity of rebellion for groups spatially concentrated enough while no harmful eﬀects
seem present for urban or dispersed groups , when controlling for unobserved heterogeneity. Furthermore,
country FE even suggest that widely dispersed groups are less likely to rebel.
As previously, results regarding the eﬀect of decentralization on communal violence diﬀer between OLS
and FE estimations, suggesting that it remains in the OLS speciﬁcation some unobserved heterogeneity.
With OLS, the point estimate of decentralization is negative and statistically signiﬁcant for groups widely
dispersed (except for unweighted regression in table 3) and positive and statistically signiﬁcant for groups
primarily urban (all speciﬁcations). On the contrary, with both group and country FE, the coeﬃcient
associated with decentralization is negative for all groups, though the magnitude of the coeﬃcient tends to
be lower with country FE. It reaches usual levels of conﬁdence for groups widely dispersed, majoritary in
one region and concentrated in one region. This result is robust to all speciﬁcations. The only diﬀerence
between both FE estimations is that the eﬀect of decentralization on widely dispersed groups is signiﬁcant
in only one of four speciﬁcations with group FE.
As the previous results tend to conﬁrm the role group concentration played in the model, it is just a
variable among the several of the model. In order to both trying to control for unobserved heterogeneity
and providing an additional test of the model, the next set of estimations focus on a new variable, supposed
to capture the essence of the theoretical conditioning variables. The model highlights the ability for a
group to bear upon politics at the local level. The characteristics which make a group well suited to achieve
that outcome is a combination of regional concentration, high group’s proportion of the population and
low interest from other groups for this region. The MAR project provides a variable called gc2 which
accounts for the presence of a rural base, deﬁned as "A spatially contiguous region larger than an urban
area that is part of the country, in which 25% or more of the minority resides and in which the minority
constitutes the predominant proportion of the population." (MAR codebook). In this paper, this variable
is slightly transformed in order to account for the existence of local majority. Hence, gc6b gauges the
group’s proportion of the whole population in the rural base. If the group represents less than 50 % of the
population, gc2 is modiﬁed from one to zero. Then, this new variable takes in account both local majority
and group concentration, in a spirit close to the model. With a slight abuse of language, this variable is
called "Local majority" and the following empirical estimations ascertain whether decentralization exerts
an impact on ethnic violence conditional on it or not.
There are several results worth noting. Firstly, there are less diﬀerences between OLS and FE estima-
tions with local majority than with group concentration as a conditioning variable. This suggests than
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the former captures better the underlying characteristics explaining in the long run decentralization and
conﬂict. Secondly, the eﬀect of decentralization is dramatically diﬀerent depending upon groups have a
local majority or not. Regarding protest, all estimators show that decentralization exerts a fueling impact
for groups lacking a local majority, and a preventive one for groups having a local majority. The former
eﬀect is statistically signiﬁcant with OLS and group FE when focusing on intensity of protest. Turning to
presence of protest, the eﬀect is much lesser, signiﬁcant only for OLS in unweighted regression and group
FE in weighted regression. The preventive eﬀect for groups having a local majority is always signiﬁcant
for group FE and almost always signiﬁcant for country FE. The same kind of results emerge for rebellion.
Once again, decentralization increases rebellion for groups without local majority and tends to decrease
it for the others. As for protest, this eﬀect is essentially true for intensity of rebellion and almost absent
for presence of rebellion. Only group FE estimations do not suggest such a result. On the other hand,
decentralization appears to signiﬁcantly reduce presence of rebellion according to all estimators (except
group FE for unweighted regression). This eﬀect vanishes when considering intensity of rebellion, except
for OLS estimations. About communal violence, every estimators lead to the result that decentralization
is unrelated to this form of conﬂict for groups without local majority. This ﬁnding is robust to weighted
regressions and the use of both forms of dependent variable, i.e. continuous and binary. Only in one case,
the eﬀect of decentralization is signiﬁcantly negative (country FE, intensity of protest, weighted regres-
sion). This is still true for groups disposing of a local majority if OLS are considered. However, turning
to FE estimations, both strongly suggest that decentralization lowers intensity and presence of commu-
nal violence coming from local majorities. This is true whatever weighted or unweighted regressions are
considered. Moreover, the eﬀect is markedly larger in magnitude than with protest or rebellion.
All the above brings evidence that decentralization exerts an signiﬁcant impact on ethnic conﬂict but
conditional on the nature of ethnic groups. Groups majoritary or concentrated in one region, as well
as those having a local majority, are eﬃciently deterred from using violence, probably because they can
fully exploit the beneﬁts of decentralization. On the contrary, groups lacking a local majority are more
likely to increase their initial levels of protest and rebellion. These results strongly support the theoretical
propositions enunciated in the paper, stating that decentralization could be useful, useless or threatening
for groups interests, with respect to groups characteristics.
6 Concluding Remarks
Decentralization is an institutional device increasingly implemented since the last decade. On the ﬁeld
of ethnic conﬂict, it is supposed to dampen strifes by giving groups control over their own aﬀairs and by
insulating minorities from predatory politics from the center. However, federalism or decentralization did
not give uniform results leading scholars to seek why countries beneﬁted from this and some others not.
This paper proposes a simple theoretical modeling of how decentralization works. Focusing on the em-
powerment mechanism, it shows that decentralization is eﬀective conditional on a number of factors, both
at group-level and country-level. Then, an empirical analysis based on these ﬁndings is led by including
all those variables in OLS estimations which are critical for decentralization be eﬀective. Likewise, ﬁxed
eﬀects estimations are used as they control for all ﬁxed through time unobserved heterogeneity.
Results tend to conﬁrm theoretical predictions. By properly controlling for the conditioning factors,
decentralization appears as an eﬀective peace-building mechanism, at least for low and moderate conﬂicts.
Then the eﬀect of decentralization has been allowed to change with group concentration score and presence
of a local majority. Once again, results are consistent with theoretical predictions to the extent that groups
spatially concentrated enough and/or having a local majority beneﬁt from decentralization while the others
are unaﬀected or harmed by the process. This calls for caution when recommending decentralization as
a peace-building mechanism. In particular, it requires to build a "‘functional"’ autonomy alongside the
territorial one in order to protect the interests of widely dispersed groups, as well as eﬃcient checks and
balances, notably at the regional level.
12
References
Alesina, A., R. Baqir, and W. Easterly (1999): “Public Goods and Ethnic Divisions,” Quarterly
Journal of Economics, 114(4), 1243–1284.
Alesina, A., A. Devleeschauwer, W. Easterly, S. Kurlat, and R. Wacziarg (2003): “Frac-
tionalization,” Journal of Economic Growth, 8(2), 155–194.
Alesina, A., and E. La Ferrara (2000): “Participation in Heterogeneous Communities,” Quarterly
Journal of Economics, 115(3), 847–904.
Bakke, K., and E. Wibbels (2006): “Federalism and Intrastate Struggles: The Role of Diversity
and Disparity,” Paper prepared for presentation at the workshop on "Decentralization, Federalism, and
Conﬂict" at the Center for Research on Inequalities, Human Security and Ethnicity (CRISE), University
of Oxford, October 6-7, 2006.
Bardhan, P. (2002): “Decentralization of Governance and Development,” Journal of Economic Per-
spectives, 16(4), 185–205.
Bardhan, P., and D. Mookherjee (2000): “Capture and Governance at Local and National Levels,”
American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings, 90(2), 135–139.
(2005): “Decentralizing Anti-Poverty Program Delivery in Developing Countries,” Journal of
Public Economics, 89, 675–704.
Beramendi, P., and R. Maiz (2004): “Spain: Unfulﬁlled Federalism (1978-1996),” in Federalsim and
Territorial Cleavages, ed. by U. Amoretti, and N. Bermeo. Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press.
Bermeo, N. (2002): “The Imports of Institutions,” Journal of Democracy, 13(2), 96–110.
Brancati, D. (2006): “Decentralization: Fueling the Fire or Dampening the Flames of Ethnic Conﬂict,”
International Organization, 60, 651–685.
Bulow, J., J. Geanakoplos, and P. Klemperer (1985): “Multimarket Oligopoly: Strategic Substi-
tutes and Complements,” Journal of Political Economy, 93(3), 488–511.
Cohen, F. (1997): “Proportional Versus Majoritarian Ethnic Conﬂict Management in Democracies,”
Comparative Political Studies, 30(5), 607–630.
Cornell, S. (2002): “Autonomy as a Source of Conﬂict: Caucasian Conﬂicts in Theoretical Perspective,”
World Politics, 54(2), 245–276.
Dixit, A., and J. Londregan (1996): “The Determinants of Success of Special Interests in Redistribu-
tive Politics,” Journal of Politics, 58(4), 1132–1155.
Esteban, J., and D. Ray (1999): “Conﬂict and Distribution,” Journal of Economic Theory, 87(2),
379–415.
Gurr, T. (1994): “Peoples Against States: Ethnopolitical Conﬂict and the Changing World System:
1994 Presidential Address,” International Studies Quarterly, 38(3), 347–377.
Hug, S. (2003): “Selection Bias in Comparative Research: The Case of Incomplete Data Sets,” Political
Analysis, 11(3), 255–274.
Kräkel, M. (2006): “On the "Adverse Selection" of Organizations,” IZA Discussion Paper 168.
Lĳphart, A. (1977): Democracies in Plural Societies: A Comparative Exploration. Yale University Press,
New Haven.
13
(1996): “The Puzzle of Indian Democracy: A Consociational Interpretation,” American Political
Science Review, 90(2), 258–268.
Lustick, I., D. Miodownik, and R. Eidelson (2004): “Secessionism in Multicultural States: Does
Sharing Power Prevent or Encourage It ?,” American Political Science Review, 94(2), 209–230.
Marshall, M., and K. Jaggers (2003): “Polity IV,” Center for International Development and Conﬂict
Management.
Oates, W. (1972): Fiscal Federalism. Harcourt, Brace and Jovanovich.
O’Neill, K. (2003): “Decentralization as an Electoral Strategy,” Comparative Political Studies, 36(9),
1068–1091.
Platteau, J.-P., and A. Abraham (2002): “Participatory Development in the Presence of Endogenous
Community Imperfections,” Journal of Development Studies, 39(2), 104–136.
Posen, B. (1993): “The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conﬂict,” Survival, 35(1), 27–47.
Riker, W. (1964): Federalism: Origin, Operation, Significance. Little Brown: Boston.
Roeder, P. (1991): “Soviet Federalism and Ethnic Mobilization,” World Politics, 43(2), 196–232.
Saideman, S., D. Lanoue, M. Campenni, and S. Stanton (2002): “Democratization, Political
Institutions and Ethnic Conﬂict: A Pooled Time-Series Analysis, 1985-1998,” Comparative Political
Studies, 35(1), 103–129.
Sambanis, N. (2001): “Do Ethnic and Non-Ethnic Civil Wars Have the Same Causes ? A Theoretical
and Empirical Inquiry (Part 1),” Journal of Conflict Resolution, 45(3), 259–282.
Seabright, P. (1996): “Accountability and Decentralisation in Government: An Incomplete Contracts
Model,” European Economic Review, 40(1), 61–89.
Simeon, R. (2004): “Canada: Federalism, Language and Regional Conﬂict,” in Federalism and Territorial
Cleavages, ed. by U. Amoretti, and N. Bermeo. Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press.
Stepan, A. (2004): “Electorally Generated Veto Players in Unitary and Federal States,” in Federalism
and Democracy in Latin America, ed. by E. Gibson, pp. 323–362. John Hopkins University Press.
Tsebelis, G. (2002): Veto Players: How Political Institutions Work. Princeton University Press.
World Bank (2003): “World Development Indicators,” Washington DC: World Bank.
14
Dependent variable Protest Rebellion Communal Violence
Group Country Group Country Group Country
Estimator OLS FE FE OLS FE FE OLS FE FE
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Unweighted regressions
Country-level Variables
Decentralization 0.004
(0.007)
−0.008
(0.015)
−0.005
(0.013)
0.008
(0.008)
0.001
(0.010)
0.003
(0.010)
−0.013
(0.014)
−0.077
(0.016)
−0.062
(0.016)
Log of GDP p.c. −0.050
(0.079)
−0.627
(0.523)
−0.572
(0.508)
−0.383
(0.091)
1.091
(0.523)
1.196
(0.559)
−0.369
(0.127)
2.521
(1.550)
2.717
(1.472)
Democracy 0.079
(0.013)
0.077
(0.027)
0.078
(0.027)
0.030
(0.023)
0.025
(0.019)
0.027
(0.019)
0.037
(0.034)
0.049
(0.056)
0.056
(0.059)
Log of Pop. 0.155
(0.096)
2.329
(1.504)
2.442
(1.377)
0.073
(0.099)
−1.400
(−1.040)
−1.235
(0.996)
0.255
(0.140)
−1.041
(3.910)
−0.830
(4.081)
Nb. of EEG −0.031
(0.119)
−0.137
(0.108)
−0.009
(0.238)
Group-level Variables
Group Coherence 0.110
(0.038)
0.026
(0.083)
0.016
(0.051)
−0.038
(0.100)
0.128
(0.058)
−0.033
(0.040)
Primarily Urban 0.572
(0.603)
1.161
(0.533)
−0.777
(1.358)
−2.660
(2.181)
−11.578
(1.245)
−2.818
(1.173)
Maj. in one region −1.098
(0.541)
−0.221
(1.283)
−0.462
(1.060)
−0.618
(0.949)
−2.618
(1.486)
−2.954
(1.998)
Conc. in one region 0.034
(0.324)
0.673
(0.481)
0.415
(0.433)
0.620
(0.485)
−0.278
(0.686)
−1.028
(0.762)
R2 0.175 0.277 0.441 0.262 0.028 0.416 0.302 0.089 0.589
Weighted regressions
Country-level Variables
Decentralization 0.013
(0.007)
−0.023
(0.019)
−0.008
(0.011)
−0.005
(0.011)
0.006
(0.013)
0.014
(0.012)
−0.021
(0.017)
−0.091
(0.018)
−0.056
(0.022)
Log of GDP p.c. −0.200
(0.062)
−0.806
(0.625)
−0.593
(0.529)
−0.410
(0.142)
1.257
(0.524)
1.410
(0.525)
−0.212
(0.137)
2.654
(1.787)
3.382
(1.679)
Democracy 0.085
(0.011)
0.087
(0.029)
0.090
(0.029)
0.039
(0.031)
0.042
(0.016)
0.045
(0.015)
0.031
(0.028)
0.036
(0.070)
0.043
(0.077)
Log of pop. 0.101
(0.103)
2.951
(1.797)
3.009
(1.312)
0.286
(0.151)
−1.267
(0.912)
−1.115
(0.850)
0.584
(0.169)
−1.182
(3.993)
−1.878
(4.818)
Nb. of EEG −0.117
(0.126)
−0.310
(0.221)
−0.064
(0.231)
Group-level Variables
Group coherence 0.108
(0.038)
0.051
(0.112)
−0.011
(0.070)
−0.023
(0.145)
0.071
(0.049)
−0.029
(0.041)
Primarily urban 0.078
(0.488)
1.026
(0.556)
−0.831
(1.077)
−5.142
(2.374)
−11.985
(1.352)
−0.533
(1.544)
Maj. in one region −0.362
(0.752)
0.370
(1.141)
−1.126
(1.318)
−0.913
(1.003)
−4.659
(1.955)
−4.264
(3.090)
Conc. in one region −0.294
(0.345)
1.006
(0.634)
0.931
(0.965)
1.251
(0.729)
−1.228
(0.637)
−2.170
(0.920)
Observations 708 708 708 708 708 708 459 459 459
Note: standard errors are in parentheses and corrected for clustering. Weighted regressions weight each observation by the
inverse of the frequency the corresponding country appears in the estimation sample. R2 refers to pseudo-R2 for OLS
estimations and within R2 for FE ones. Excluded category for Group concentration: widely dispersed. All regressions control
for time effects. OLSa include the following additional controls: gprop, localprop and localprop*groupcon.
Table 1: Decentralization and intensity of ethnic conﬂict
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Presence of Presence of Presence of
Dependent variable Protest Rebellion Communal Violence
Group Country Group Country Group Country
Estimator OLS FE FE OLS FE FE OLS FE FE
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Unweighted regressions
Country-level Variables
Decentralization 0.000
(0.003)
−0.009
(0.008)
−0.008
(0.007)
−0.002
(0.003)
−0.006
(0.003)
−0.004
(0.004)
−0.003
(0.003)
−0.012
(0.004)
−0.009
(0.004)
Log of GDP p.c. −0.033
(0.031)
−0.179
(0.184)
−0.167
(0.180)
−0.058
(0.029)
0.462
(0.197)
0.483
(0.192)
−0.078
(0.034)
0.670
(0.485)
0.685
(0.457)
Democracy 0.023
(0.007)
0.035
(0.013)
0.036
(0.012)
0.015
(0.008)
0.015
(0.005)
0.015
(0.005)
0.012
(0.009)
0.023
(0.014)
0.024
(0.014)
Log of Pop. 0.000
(0.040)
0.236
(0.641)
0.258
(0.622)
0.038
(0.033)
−0.292
(0.357)
−0.228
(0.329)
0.070
(0.031)
−0.739
(0.940)
−0.710
(0.874)
Nb. of EEG 0.028
(0.035)
−0.042
(0.037)
−0.036
(0.062)
Group-level variables
Group Coherence 0.023
(0.012)
0.022
(0.031)
0.000
(0.016)
−0.024
(0.024)
0.025
(0.015)
−0.010
(0.012)
Primarily Urban −0.398
(0.207)
−0.400
(0.193)
−0.300
(0.609)
−0.514
(0.322)
−2.224
(0.294)
−0.902
(0.331)
Maj. in one region −0.220
(0.200)
0.535
(0.281)
−0.183
(0.276)
−0.369
(0.484)
−1.168
(0.395)
−1.097
(0.532)
Conc. in one region 0.024
(0.131)
0.267
(0.195)
0.186
(0.143)
0.158
(0.165)
−0.166
(0.168)
−0.264
(0.190)
R2 0.162 0.116 0.401 0.306 0.099 0.582 0.281 0.050 0.578
Weighted regressions
Country-level variables
Decentralization 0.000
(0.004)
−0.016
(0.008)
−0.014
(0.005)
−0.005
(0.004)
−0.003
(0.004)
0.001
(0.004)
−0.004
(0.004)
−0.015
(0.004)
−0.008
(0.005)
Log of GDP p.c. −0.100
(0.024)
−0.197
(0.147)
−0.168
(0.151)
−0.032
(0.039)
0.532
(0.242)
0.596
(0.233)
−0.061
(0.039)
0.616
(0.507)
0.748
(0.459)
Democracy 0.029
(0.007)
0.043
(0.014)
0.043
(0.014)
0.012
(0.010)
0.013
(0.008)
0.014
(0.008)
0.007
(0.007)
0.020
(0.021)
0.021
(0.022)
Log of pop. −0.035
(0.039)
0.693
(0.671)
0.699
(0.624)
0.117
(0.051)
−0.426
(0.377)
−0.412
(0.363)
0.107
(0.037)
−0.662
(0.964)
−0.796
(0.911)
Nb. of EEG 0.005
(0.035)
−0.065
(0.066)
−0.036
(0.063)
Group-level variables
Group coherence 0.029
(0.018)
0.043
(0.037)
−0.011
(0.019)
−0.021
(0.036)
0.019
(0.011)
−0.003
(0.011)
Primarily urban −0.454
(0.203)
−0.119
(0.216)
−0.225
(0.354)
−0.947
(0.330)
−2.425
(0.356)
−0.203
(0.367)
Maj. in one region 0.039
(0.193)
0.480
(0.272)
−0.323
(0.412)
−0.128
(0.451)
−1.275
(0.489)
−1.029
(0.727)
Conc. in one region −0.093
(0.151)
0.504
(0.245)
0.220
(0.244)
0.305
(0.202)
−0.383
(0.163)
−0.527
(0.223)
Observations 708 708 708 708 708 708 459 459 459
Note: standard errors are in parentheses and corrected for clustering. Weighted regressions weight each observation by the
inverse of the frequency the corresponding country appears in the estimation sample. R2 refers to pseudo-R2 for OLS
estimations and within R2 for FE ones. Excluded category for Group concentration: widely dispersed. All regressions control
for time effects. OLSa include the following additional controls: gprop, localprop and localprop*groupcon.
Table 2: Decentralization and presence of ethnic conﬂict
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Dependent variable Protest Rebellion Communal Violence
Group Country Group Country Group Country
Estimator OLS FE FE OLS FE FE OLS FE FE
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Unweighted regressions
Decentralization 0.021
(0.009)
0.059
(0.021)
0.027
(0.015)
0.015
(0.013)
0.013
(0.011)
−0.076
(0.041)
−0.011
(0.019)
−0.038
(0.056)
−0.100
(0.037)
Primarily urban 0.546
(0.544)
1.252
(0.932)
−1.736
(0.545)
−8.106
(4.081)
−10.789
(1.154)
−4.026
(1.356)
Maj. in one region −0.136
(0.690)
1.130
(1.187)
−0.708
(0.778)
−4.068
(1.594)
−3.516
(1.827)
−4.243
(2.245)
Conc. in one region 0.782
(0.475)
1.958
(0.845)
0.909
(0.451)
0.857
(1.091)
0.096
(1.163)
−0.046
(1.245)
Dec.*Primarily urban 0.020
(0.013)
−0.072
(0.033)
−0.083
(0.051)
0.102
(0.015)
0.013
(0.042)
0.397
(0.233)
0.048
(0.028)
0.040
(0.088)
0.086
(0.062)
Dec.*Maj. in one reg. −0.039
(0.011)
−0.086
(0.021)
−0.034
(0.012)
0.005
(0.027)
−0.023
(0.014)
0.096
(0.039)
0.031
(0.033)
−0.051
(0.054)
0.050
(0.042)
Dec.*Conc. in one reg. −0.023
(0.009)
−0.061
(0.022)
−0.040
(0.014)
−0.002
(0.036)
−0.005
(0.032)
0.037
(0.045)
−0.011
(0.023)
−0.018
(0.060)
−0.019
(0.031)
Marginal Effect of decentralization for groups:
Widely dispersed 0.021
(0.009)
0.059
(0.021)
0.027
(0.015)
0.015
(0.013)
0.013
(0.011)
−0.076
(0.041)
−0.011
(0.019)
−0.038
(0.056)
−0.100
(0.037)
Primarily urban 0.040
(0.011)
−0.013
(0.024)
−0.056
(0.047)
0.117
(0.015)
0.026
(0.044)
0.321
(0.216)
0.037
(0.024)
0.002
(0.048)
−0.013
(0.053)
Maj. in one region −0.018
(0.012)
−0.027
(0.010)
−0.007
(0.011)
0.020
(0.020)
−0.010
(0.010)
0.020
(0.018)
0.020
(0.040)
−0.090
(0.012)
−0.049
(0.025)
Conc. in one region −0.002
(0.007)
−0.002
(0.015)
−0.012
(0.018)
0.000
(0.010)
0.011
(0.037)
−0.039
(0.025)
−0.022
(0.017)
−0.057
(0.036)
−0.119
(0.038)
R2 0.079 0.458 0.494 0.298 0.316 0.031 0.315 0.093 0.606
Weighted regressions
Decentralization 0.032
(0.008)
0.075
(0.021)
0.022
(0.015)
−0.011
(0.020)
0.004
(0.010)
−0.039
(0.031)
−0.028
(0.016)
−0.057
(0.062)
−0.130
(0.042)
Primarily urban 0.099
(0.556)
1.634
(1.184)
−2.342
(0.932)
−5.701
(3.716)
−11.462
(1.332)
−3.083
(2.020)
Maj. in one region 0.847
(0.750)
1.495
(1.193)
−1.849
(1.241)
−2.255
(1.131)
−5.986
(2.190)
−6.502
(2.533)
Conc. in one region 0.453
(0.445)
1.948
(0.898)
0.879
(0.835)
0.997
(0.604)
−1.271
(0.906)
−0.409
(1.576)
Dec.*Primarily urban 0.022
(0.013)
−0.077
(0.027)
−0.112
(0.066)
0.113
(0.025)
0.002
(0.025)
0.259
(0.182)
0.057
(0.024)
0.047
(0.088)
0.091
(0.056)
Dec.*Maj. in one reg. −0.040
(0.011)
−0.118
(0.021)
−0.033
(0.014)
0.025
(0.032)
−0.015
(0.015)
0.057
(0.032)
0.043
(0.040)
−0.037
(0.064)
0.076
(0.041)
Dec.*Conc. in one reg. −0.025
(0.008)
−0.079
(0.030)
−0.037
(0.019)
0.001
(0.022)
0.059
(0.049)
−0.002
(0.023)
0.002
(0.024)
−0.052
(0.097)
−0.031
(0.035)
Marginal Effect of decentralization for groups:
Widely dispersed 0.032
(0.008)
0.075
(0.021)
0.022
(0.015)
−0.011
(0.020)
0.004
(0.010)
−0.039
(0.031)
−0.028
(0.016)
−0.057
(0.062)
−0.130
(0.042)
Primarily urban 0.054
(0.010)
−0.002
(0.016)
−0.089
(0.061)
0.102
(0.019)
0.006
(0.025)
0.219
(0.177)
0.029
(0.022)
−0.010
(0.051)
−0.039
(0.045)
Maj. in one region −0.008
(0.009)
−0.043
(0.014)
−0.011
(0.011)
0.014
(0.021)
−0.012
(0.013)
0.017
(0.017)
0.014
(0.046)
−0.094
(0.020)
−0.054
(0.016)
Conc. in one region 0.007
(0.004)
−0.004
(0.021)
−0.015
(0.024)
−0.010
(0.014)
0.063
(0.047)
−0.042
(0.020)
−0.026
(0.022)
−0.109
(0.060)
−0.161
(0.031)
Observations 708 708 708 708 708 708 459 459 459
Note: standard errors are in parentheses and corrected for clustering. Weighted regressions weight each observation by the
inverse of the frequency the corresponding country appears in the estimation sample. R2 refers to pseudo-R2 for OLS
estimations and within R2 for FE ones. Excluded category for Group concentration: widely dispersed. All regressions control
for time effects. OLSa include the following additional controls: gprop, localprop and localprop*groupcon. Same other controls
as in tables 1 and 2 but not shown.
Table 3: Decentralization and intensity of ethnic conﬂict: the role of group concentration
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Presence of Presence of Presence of
Dependent variable Protest Rebellion Communal Violence
Group Country Group Country Group Country
Estimator OLS FE FE OLS FE FE OLS FE FE
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Unweighted regressions
Decentralization 0.003
(0.004)
0.010
(0.012)
0.003
(0.009)
0.001
(0.003)
0.004
(0.005)
−0.015
(0.006)
−0.007
(0.005)
−0.018
(0.017)
−0.025
(0.009)
Primarily urban −0.363
(0.251)
−0.120
(0.410)
−0.735
(0.168)
−0.830
(0.339)
−2.080
(0.257)
−1.327
(0.334)
Maj. in one region 0.023
(0.279)
0.992
(0.384)
−0.309
(0.203)
−0.836
(0.345)
−1.631
(0.376)
−1.692
(0.566)
Conc. in one region 0.132
(0.197)
0.593
(0.297)
0.422
(0.179)
0.416
(0.226)
−0.281
(0.276)
−0.331
(0.295)
Dec.*Primarily urban −0.001
(0.006)
−0.032
(0.015)
−0.044
(0.023)
0.047
(0.005)
−0.012
(0.009)
0.025
(0.018)
0.017
(0.007)
0.017
(0.024)
0.023
(0.013)
Dec.*Maj. in one reg. −0.009
(0.006)
−0.030
(0.012)
−0.012
(0.006)
0.003
(0.006)
−0.013
(0.007)
0.018
(0.005)
0.016
(0.007)
0.005
(0.016)
0.019
(0.009)
Dec.*Conc. in one reg. −0.003
(0.003)
−0.002
(0.012)
−0.011
(0.005)
−0.012
(0.012)
−0.029
(0.023)
−0.005
(0.005)
0.005
(0.006)
0.012
(0.017)
−0.331
(0.295)
Marginal Effect of decentralization for groups:
Widely dispersed 0.003
(0.004)
0.010
(0.012)
0.003
(0.009)
0.001
(0.003)
0.004
(0.005)
−0.015
(0.006)
−0.007
(0.005)
−0.018
(0.017)
−0.025
(0.009)
Primarily urban 0.002
(0.005)
−0.022
(0.008)
−0.041
(0.019)
0.048
(0.005)
−0.008
(0.006)
0.010
(0.016)
0.010
(0.004)
0.000
(0.011)
−0.002
(0.010)
Maj. in one region −0.006
(0.005)
−0.020
(0.005)
−0.010
(0.007)
0.004
(0.005)
−0.009
(0.004)
0.002
(0.005)
0.010
(0.008)
−0.014
(0.003)
−0.006
(0.005)
Conc. in one region 0.000
(0.003)
0.008
(0.007)
−0.008
(0.007)
−0.006
(0.004)
−0.008
(0.013)
−0.020
(0.006)
−0.003
(0.003)
−0.006
(0.007)
−0.021
(0.009)
R2 0.174 0.148 0.416 0.382 0.106 0.620 0.308 0.051 0.594
Weighted regressions
Decentralization 0.006
(0.005)
0.015
(0.012)
−0.004
(0.007)
−0.005
(0.005)
0.000
(0.003)
−0.023
(0.009)
−0.010
(0.004)
−0.026
(0.018)
−0.031
(0.011)
Primarily urban −0.351
(0.265)
0.211
(0.435)
−0.796
(0.244)
−1.113
(0.473)
−2.340
(0.324)
−0.945
(0.437)
Maj. in one region 0.414
(0.262)
0.847
(0.348)
−0.483
(0.366)
−0.984
(0.423)
−1.796
(0.493)
−1.781
(0.654)
Conc. in one region 0.165
(0.195)
0.708
(0.263)
0.318
(0.261)
0.341
(0.316)
−0.610
(0.225)
−0.425
(0.359)
Dec.*Primarily urban 0.000
(0.007)
−0.035
(0.014)
−0.047
(0.025)
0.046
(0.007)
−0.006
(0.006)
0.050
(0.031)
0.022
(0.004)
0.026
(0.023)
0.025
(0.015)
Dec.*Maj. in one reg. −0.012
(0.006)
−0.040
(0.012)
−0.011
(0.005)
0.006
(0.008)
−0.006
(0.004)
0.028
(0.008)
0.016
(0.008)
0.013
(0.018)
0.024
(0.010)
Dec.*Conc. in one reg. −0.008
(0.004)
−0.013
(0.014)
−0.009
(0.007)
−0.003
(0.006)
0.003
(0.016)
0.006
(0.010)
0.007
(0.005)
0.011
(0.021)
0.003
(0.008)
Marginal Effect of decentralization for groups:
Widely dispersed 0.006
(0.005)
0.015
(0.012)
−0.004
(0.007)
−0.005
(0.005)
0.000
(0.003)
−0.023
(0.009)
−0.010
(0.004)
−0.026
(0.018)
−0.031
(0.011)
Primarily urban 0.006
(0.006)
−0.020
(0.006)
−0.051
(0.022)
0.041
(0.007)
−0.006
(0.004)
0.026
(0.026)
0.011
(0.002)
−0.001
(0.013)
−0.006
(0.011)
Maj. in one region −0.006
(0.006)
−0.026
(0.005)
−0.015
(0.005)
0.001
(0.006)
−0.006
(0.002)
0.004
(0.006)
0.006
(0.009)
−0.014
(0.005)
−0.007
(0.003)
Conc. in one region −0.002
(0.003)
0.001
(0.010)
−0.013
(0.008)
−0.008
(0.005)
0.004
(0.016)
−0.017
(0.009)
−0.003
(0.004)
−0.015
(0.010)
−0.028
(0.008)
Observations 708 708 708 708 708 708 459 459 459
Note: standard errors are in parentheses and corrected for clustering. Weighted regressions weight each observation by the
inverse of the frequency the corresponding country appears in the estimation sample. R2 refers to pseudo-R2 for OLS
estimations and within R2 for FE ones. Excluded category for Group concentration: widely dispersed. All regressions control
for time effects. OLSa include the following additional controls: gprop, localprop and localprop*groupcon. Same other controls
as in tables 1 and 2 but not shown.
Table 4: Decentralization and presence of ethnic conﬂict: the role of group concentration
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Dependent variable Protest Rebellion Communal Violence
Group Country Group Country Group Country
Estimator OLS FE FE OLS FE FE OLS FE FE
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Unweighted regressions
Decentralization 0.018
(0.009)
0.038
(0.012)
0.021
(0.010)
0.019
(0.006)
−0.013
(0.011)
0.013
(0.013)
0.003
(0.014)
0.012
(0.029)
−0.019
(0.026)
Local maj. 1.009
(0.263)
0.277
(0.807)
1.611
(0.424)
0.956
(0.738)
1.255
(0.638)
2.449
(1.314)
Dec.*Local maj. −0.032
(0.006)
−0.056
(0.016)
−0.030
(0.007)
−0.030
(0.009)
0.007
(0.017)
−0.026
(0.010)
−0.018
(0.016)
−0.077
(0.034)
−0.033
(0.019)
Marginal Effect of decentralization for groups:
No local maj. 0.018
(0.009)
0.038
(0.012)
0.021
(0.010)
0.019
(0.006)
−0.013
(0.011)
0.013
(0.013)
0.003
(0.014)
0.012
(0.029)
−0.019
(0.026)
Local maj. −0.014
(0.007)
−0.018
(0.011)
−0.009
(0.010)
−0.012
(0.007)
−0.014
(0.012)
−0.004
(0.011)
−0.015
(0.016)
−0.065
(0.019)
−0.051
(0.019)
R2 0.210 0.054 0.375 0.307 0.014 0.447 0.144 0.059 0.421
Weighted regressions
Decentralization 0.021
(0.009)
0.056
(0.019)
0.009
(0.011)
0.024
(0.007)
0.006
(0.012)
0.028
(0.015)
0.013
(0.016)
−0.007
(0.033)
−0.047
(0.019)
Local maj. 0.338
(0.510)
1.266
(0.446)
1.436
(0.581)
1.941
(0.604)
1.326
(0.757)
2.963
(1.360)
Dec.*Local maj. −0.031
(0.009)
−0.091
(0.024)
−0.027
(0.011)
−0.047
(0.009)
−0.018
(0.020)
−0.044
(0.012)
−0.075
(0.039)
0.000
(0.019)
−0.019
(0.017)
Marginal Effect of decentralization for groups:
No local maj. 0.021
(0.009)
0.056
(0.019)
0.009
(0.011)
0.024
(0.007)
0.006
(0.012)
0.028
(0.015)
0.013
(0.016)
−0.007
(0.033)
−0.047
(0.019)
Local maj. −0.009
(0.007)
−0.036
(0.011)
−0.018
(0.008)
−0.023
(0.008)
−0.016
(0.013)
0.004
(0.011)
0.001
(0.018)
−0.082
(0.015)
−0.066
(0.016)
Observations 1037 1037 1037 1037 1037 1037 1037 1037 1037
Note: standard errors are in parentheses and corrected for clustering. Weighted regressions weight each observation by the
inverse of the frequency the corresponding country appears in the estimation sample. R2 refers to pseudo-R2 for OLS
estimations and within R2 for FE ones. Excluded category for Group concentration: widely dispersed. All regressions control
for time effects. OLSa include the following additional controls: gprop, localprop and localprop*groupcon. Same other controls
as in tables 1 and 2 but not shown.
Table 5: Decentralization and intensity of ethnic conﬂict: the role of local majority
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Presence of Presence of Presence of
Dependent variable Protest Rebellion Communal Violence
Group Country Group Country Group Country
Estimator OLS FE FE OLS FE FE OLS FE FE
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Unweighted regressions
Decentralization 0.005
(0.003)
0.007
(0.006)
−0.003
(0.005)
0.003
(0.002)
−0.015
(0.007)
−0.002
(0.006)
0.002
(0.004)
−0.002
(0.008)
0.000
(0.006)
Local maj. 0.212
(0.140)
−0.163
(0.204)
0.536
(0.153)
0.238
(0.317)
0.471
(0.166)
0.593
(0.280)
Dec.*Local maj. −0.007
(0.003)
−0.021
(0.008)
−0.007
(0.003)
−0.011
(0.003)
0.008
(0.008)
−0.009
(0.003)
−0.004
(0.004)
−0.008
(0.008)
−0.008
(0.005)
Marginal Effect of decentralization for groups:
No local maj. 0.005
(0.003)
0.007
(0.006)
0.003
(0.005)
0.003
(0.002)
−0.015
(0.007)
−0.002
(0.006)
0.002
(0.004)
−0.002
(0.008)
0.000
(0.006)
Local maj. −0.003
(0.003)
−0.014
(0.005)
−0.010
(0.005)
−0.009
(0.003)
−0.006
(0.005)
−0.011
(0.006)
−0.002
(0.004)
−0.009
(0.003)
−0.009
(0.003)
R2 0.133 0.082 0.327 0.300 0.070 0.441 0.126 0.025 0.387
Weighted regressions
Decentralization 0.005
(0.004)
0.010
(0.007)
−0.008
(0.006)
0.004
(0.002)
−0.006
(0.007)
0.005
(0.005)
0.003
(0.004)
−0.007
(0.010)
−0.007
(0.004)
Local maj. 0.018
(0.233)
0.244
(0.362)
0.403
(0.190)
0.694
(0.235)
0.387
(0.162)
0.653
(0.280)
Dec.*Local maj. −0.008
(0.005)
−0.030
(0.008)
−0.007
(0.006)
−0.015
(0.003)
−0.001
(0.008)
−0.013
(0.004)
−0.001
(0.004)
−0.006
(0.010)
−0.004
(0.004)
Marginal Effect of decentralization for groups:
No local maj. 0.005
(0.004)
0.010
(0.007)
−0.008
(0.006)
0.004
(0.002)
−0.006
(0.007)
0.005
(0.005)
0.003
(0.004)
−0.007
(0.010)
−0.007
(0.004)
Local maj. −0.003
(0.003)
−0.020
(0.004)
−0.015
(0.005)
−0.011
(0.002)
−0.006
(0.004)
−0.008
(0.004)
0.002
(0.004)
−0.013
(0.002)
−0.011
(0.003)
Observations 1037 1037 1037 1037 1037 1037 672 672 672
Note: standard errors are in parentheses and corrected for clustering. Weighted regressions weight each observation by the
inverse of the frequency the corresponding country appears in the estimation sample. R2 refers to pseudo-R2 for OLS
estimations and within R2 for FE ones. Excluded category for Group concentration: widely dispersed. All regressions control
for time effects. OLSa include the following additional controls: gprop, localprop and localprop*groupcon. Same other controls
as in tables 1 and 2 but not shown.
Table 6: Decentralization and presence of ethnic conﬂict: the role of local majority
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Appendix : List of countries (ranked by MAR code)
United States Canada Dominican Republic Mexico
Nicaragua Costa Rica Panama Colombia
Peru Brazil Bolivia Paraguay
Chile United Kingdom Switzerland Spain
Germany Hungary Czech Republic Slovak Republic
Italy Croatia Bulgaria Moldova
Romania Russia Estonia Latvia
Lithuania Ukraine Belarus Georgia
Azerbaĳan Zimbabwe South Africa Iran
Israel India Sri Lanka Thailand
Malaysia Indonesia Australia
Table 7: Countries present for estimations with local majority
United States Canada Mexico Nicaragua
Costa Rica Peru Brazil Paraguay
United Kingdom Switzerland Spain Hungary
Czech Republic Slovak Republic Italy Croatia
Bulgaria Moldova Romania Russia
Estonia Latvia Lithuania Ukraine
Belarus Georgia Azerbaĳan Zimbabwe
South Africa Iran Israel India
Sri Lanka Thailand Malaysia Indonesia
Australia
Table 8: Countries present for estimations with group concentration
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